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INTERNATIONAL LAW-JURISDICTION OF INTERJ.'iATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

-On May 1, 1951, Iranian legislation enacting the so-called nationalization of
the oil industry in Iran received the imperial assent. Thus was set in motion
the increasingly bitter course of events whereby Iran has practically cut herself
off from the western world. A not insignificant element in these events is the
abortive effort of the British to deal with the problem through the International
Court of Justice. On July 5, 1951, the United Kingdom obtained an order
from the Court designed to maintain the status quo pending further judicial
proceedings. 1 In the subsequent course of these proceedings the U .K. made
certain requests going to the merits of the case and was met by Iran's refusal
to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court. This had the effect of suspending

1

I.C.J. Reports 89 (1951). See also note 45 AM. J. INT. L. 789 (1951).
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the proceedings on the merits and the controversy over jurisdiction was argued.
These arguments were concluded on June 23, 1952.2 On June 26, Iran,
severely hurt economically, and with the fields shut tight, conceded its inability to sell oil abroad since nationalization.8 Faced with this situation the
Court held: it did not have jurisdiction for want of Iran's consent under her
Declaration of 1932 made pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
of the International Court.4 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (Jurisdiction), Judgment of July 22, 1952: I. C. J. Reports 1952, p. 93.
The jurisdiction of the Court in disputes between states is based on the
consent of the states and is in no way "compulsory." Article 36 of the statute
provides for "compulsory" jurisdiction in the sense that by appropriate Declaration a state can agree prior to any specific dispute to accept jurisdiction to the
extent that the other party accepts "the same obligation." Both the United
Kingdom and Iran had filed such Declarations, Iran's being most pertinent in
this dispute because it was narrower in scope than that of the U.K. Iran's
Declaration is ambiguous, the key parts, translated from the original French,
reading:
"[Iran accepts compulsory jurisdiction per Article 36, paragraph 2] in
any disputes arising after ratification of the present declaration with
regard to situations or facts relating directly or indirectly to the application of treaties or conventions accepted by [Iran] and subsequent to
the ratification of this declaration.''u
,
The Court established that in dealing with this "It must seek the interpretation which is in harmony with a natural and reasonable way of reading the
text, having due regard to the intention of [Iran] at the time it accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction.'' 0 The first question receiving the benefit of these
standards was Iran's intention in using the words "subsequent to the ratification of this declaration.'' The Court concluded that this referred to "treaties
or conventions," contrary to the U.K.'s contention that it referred to "situations
or facts.'' In so doing the Court asserted this was the more reasonable construction, and, further, that such was the intent of Iran, as evidenced by the
fact that Iran was at the time in the midst of shedding itself of the capitulatory
regime imposed upon it by a variety of treaties which it had unilaterally
denounced, the restrictions in the Declaration being designed to keep these old
treaties from the International Court. The Court also felt free to refer to
Iranian legislation which had put such a meaning on the Declaration. While
both the historical situation and the legislation can be considered relevant
evidence of Iran's "subjective" intent, it seems clear that the legislation should

2 13 UNITED NATIONS BuL., No. 1, p. 34 (July 1, 1952). There is also a good brief
discussion of the judgment in 13 UNITED NATIONS BuL., No. 3, p. 149 (Aug. 1, 1952).
3 NEw Yoruc TxMEs, June 27, 1952, p. 6:5.
4 Statute of the International Court of Justice: 59 Stat. L. 1055 at 1060 (1945).
5 I.C.J. Reports 93 at 103 (1952).
6 Id. at 104.
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have had no evidentiary value. The problem is Iran's intent as conveyed to
the other adherents to the Court's jurisdiction, and it would seem that no
state is required to take notice of another's internal legislation in ascertaining
that intent. 7
Even assuming that the Declaration relates only to treaties or conventions
accepted subsequent to the ratification of the Declaration, an ambiguity persists
in the meaning of the words, "relating directly or indirectly." The U.K. was
relying primarily on the most-favored-nation clauses of its treaties with Iran
of 1857 and 1903,8 long anterior to the Declaration, but meaningless unless
given substance by treaty between Iran and some third party-in this case
Denmark-there being a treaty made in 1934 providing for reciprocal treatment of their nationals "as regards their persons and property, in accordance
with the principles and practice of ordinary international law.'' 0 The Court
very summarily decided that the phrase, "relating directly or indirectly," merely
modified the words, "situations or facts," dismissing the idea that a given factual
situation could relate "indirectly" to a treaty. The other viewpoint is that the
present dispute related "indirectly" to the treaty with Denmark through the
most-favored-nation clauses of the treaties with the U .K. It seems clear that
had the Court desired to go the other way this is the point at which it could
have done so most easily. It apparently based its decision entirely on "the
natural and reasonable way of reading the text," and well it might have ignored
the question of Iran's intent. The desire of Iran to avoid litigation on the
capitulatory treaties could not have been prejudiced by the interpretation
urged by the U.K.10 This general argument was the principal basis of the
dissents of Judges Hackworth and Read. Their development is persuasive and
to the author, at least, compelling. Hackworth observes: "It is in [the Danish
treaty] and not in the most-favored-nation clause that the substantive rights
of British nationals are to be found. Until that treaty was concluded, the
most-favored-nation clauses . . . were but promises. They related to rights
'in futuro.' There was a right to claim something but it was an inchoate
right." 11

7 "It is certain that France cannot rely on her own legislation to limit the scope of her
international obligations." Free Zones Case, Penn. Ct. Int. J., Order, Dec. 6, 1930, Ser.
A, No. 24, p. 12: 2 HUDSON, WoRLD CoURT REPORTS 448, 490 (1935). See also 5
HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAw 166 et seq., and 252, 253.
8 I.C.J. Reports 93 at 108 (1952). ·
9 Ibid.
10 As Judge Read points out, at 147, Iran herself did not view the most favored nation
treaties as prejudicial to her efforts to be free of the capitulatory regime. Assuming that
the substantive rights in question must still come from a treaty subsequent to the 1932
Declaration, surely Iran would not then negotiate any such treaty providing for capitulatory
rights, and it is equally clear that such rights are not "in accordance with the principles
and practice of ordinary international law," as the Danish Treaty provides. See the discussion in 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 849 et seq. (1945).
11 I.C.J. Reports 93 at 140-141 (1952).
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The only remaining issue of substance was disposed of with the Court's
decision that any tacit inter-state12 agreement arising out of the concession dispute of 1933 was not a "treaty or convention" within the terms of Iran's
Declaration. At the time Iran had attempted to cancel the D'Arey concession
and the U .K. had referred the case to the Council of the League of Nations.
Subsequently the dispute, and the present concession agreements, had been
worked out under the good offices of a Rapporteur appointed by the Council,
the text of the Concession Contract appearing in the report of the Rapporteur
declaring an end to the dispute. The U .K. had argued that the peculiar
circumstances of this arrangement had given rise to a tacit "treaty" obligation
to respect the contract.
Although the Court pursued what was obviously the more cautious course
it is regrettable that it did so in view of the immense prestige latent in a
successful solution of this dispute.13
Duncan Noble, S.Ed.

12 I.e., "international," as distinguished from the concession agreement proper which
was not between states but a state and a national of another state.
13 The United Kingdom's permanent member of the Court, Sir Arnold McNair, concurred with the majority in a separate opinion but disputed the admissibility as evidence
of the Iranian legislation interpreting the declaration. The two dissents of prime interest
were those of Hackworth and Read noted above, although Judge Alvarez, Chile, provided
an interesting discussion of a "new international law.'' Judge Levi Carniero, Brazil, went
on to consider the merits to some extent in his dissent, concluding that Iran, in failing to
provide adequate compensation for the expropriation, had committed a denial of justice and
hence a breach of international law.

